



















In this chapter, I consider the social causation and social construction of mental health. To do this, I draw on sociology and social philosophy, and key findings from this book to put forward an argument in three parts. I begin by summarising them and then explore each part in greater depth.

Social Causation and Social Construction

First, when considering the social determinants of mental health, we should not only uncover the processes of social causation, by focussing on the social epidemiology of mental illness and mental health, but also those processes of social construction that affect how notions of illness, health and care are defined within professional contexts and wider society. Identifying them as distinct social processes helps to clarify two principle social dimensions of mental health. There are those social determinants that give rise to the phenomena of mental illness and mental health and there are ways in which these phenomena are variously conceptualised, affecting how people, who are defined as mentally ill, are viewed and treated by caring professionals, family members, and broader communities.

Six Features of the Human Condition

Second, whatever social conceptions of wellbeing and mental health are used and developed, all must accommodate six features of the human condition that I describe in this chapter. Moreover, the precise relationship between these features varies, depending on the philosophical meanings of wellbeing and their relationship to our understanding of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ mental health outcomes, and how these meanings are, in turn, socially constructed. Social construction affects the ways in which health and illness are defined, explained and addressed across different social contexts.

Agency, Cognition and Evaluation

Third, the roles that personal agency, cognition, and evaluation play in people’s lives should be accommodated when explanations of mental health, which are derived from both medical and social causation and/or construction, are used as social conceptions. That is, defending a broadly non-determinist account of wellbeing and mental health which, I argue here, should be central to developing mental healthcare. This accommodation also allows scope for individual choice and agency.  This opens-up new possibilities for both viewing and treating those persons who are defined as mentally ill. In short, patients, clients or service-users are seen not as passive recipients of circumstances beyond their control, but as active participants or coproducers in how their care is defined, managed and implemented, and how their mental illness and mental health is subjectively defined and given meaning in their lives. 

THE SOCIAL CAUSATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MENTAL HEALTH

There is a distinction made in sociology between social causation and social construction (Clarke and Cochrane, 1998; Burr 2003; Gergen and Gergen 2003). Simply described, the former concept significantly underpinned the origins of sociology in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, when academic enquiry began to systematically identify social determinants of human characteristics and behaviour. For example, although its methodology has since been criticised, Emile Durkheim’s seminal study on suicide, identified how social as well as individual factors affect suicide rates (Durkheim, 2006, first published in 1897). By comparing social statistics between countries, Durkheim found that people of Catholic faith, especially in Southern Europe, women, and married persons with children, are least likely to commit suicide. Therefore, he concluded that what seems to be a highly individual decision to take one’s life, reflecting individual personality, personal circumstances, and so on, is a decision with causal factors relating to membership of social groups. Reflecting the themes explored throughout this book, it can be claimed, then, that there are many social causes of mental illness and mental health rates that reflect the social groups a person belongs to, and affect the individual decisions she makes and the kinds of experiences she has concerning her mental illness and mental health. 

However, the notion of social construction is differently orientated and comes from later sociological and social philosophical analysis. This analysis was developed particularly, but not exclusively, in the second half of the 20th Century and has had a profound influence on the study of social policy, sociology, and branches of psychology and social psychology (Clarke and Cochrane, 1998; Burr, 2003; Gergen and Gergen, 2003; Horwitz, 2012). It was influenced by, for example, the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1998; 2000) and of Martin Heidegger (1962), Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman​[1]​ (1967) and Michel Foucault (1954; 1988). This use of language affected how we view certain forms of behaviour or characteristics, define them and treat them within these contexts (Clarke and Cochrane, 1998; Walker, 2006; Busfield, 2008). According to this analysis, the social construction process is socially caused. However, social causation as interpreted traditionally in sociology, does not take account of how social factors also contribute to the various meanings attributed to individual people’s and/or group behaviour or characteristics. 

Moreover, for social constructionists, these socially attributed meanings are mediated through exercising institutional power which changes over time and between cultures, resulting in the same behaviour and characteristics being viewed differently depending on the social context. For example, Foucault explored how the very term ‘mental illness’ was created by an European Enlightenment discourse which defined this condition as symptomatic of cognitive dysfunctions that are to be remedied, if possible, through medical institutional practices (Foucault, 1954; 1988). Whereas, within mediaeval Europe, the behaviour and characteristics associated with what we now call mental illness were viewed as symptomatic of satanic possession to be remedied, if possible, through religious institutional practices (and see Walker 2006; Busfield 2008; Horwitz, 2012). 

To summarise so far, the epidemiology of mental illness and mental health not only has social causes, but the concept of mental illness and mental health is socially constructed in ways that variously shape how wider society views and responds to those behaviours and characteristics associated with mental illness and mental health. The social constructionist explains this variance as a product of how language is used socially and created through public discourses, which, in turn, reflect powerful institutional practices that shape how the social world we live in is defined or ‘given meaning’​[2]​.

SIX FEATURES OF THE HUMAN CONDITION AND COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF WELLBEING

This section identifies six features of the human condition and it explores how they relate to competing conceptions of wellbeing and mental health. The main contention is that the relationship between these features varies depending on which philosophical position is taken regarding the meanings of wellbeing and mental health, and how these meanings are socially constructed. In turn, these meanings affect how both the medical and the social causation factors for mental health and illness are identified and defined. Table 1 summarises the six features of the human condition. 

   Table 1: Six features of the human condition summarised 
Embodiment 	The physical and/or biological characteristics that enable us to relate and connect to the world 
Finiteness 	We are linked by beginnings and ends 
Sociability 	We are members of social groups that produce rules of behaviour 
Cognition 	Our mind oriented processes that: exercise logic; gather information and evidence; and engage imagination 
Evaluation 	We engage in complex processes of evaluation 





The first feature is our embodiment. Simply put, we have physical and/or biological characteristics that enable us to relate and connect with the world through, in part, bodily sensations and experiences. These connections include: our senses of touch, sight, hearing, taste; our experiences of pain and pleasure; our physical needs for food, water, shelter, rest, warmth; our wants, desires and aversions; our emotions of joy, happiness, anger, sadness, fear, and, our emotional feelings towards others, such as pity, compassion, disgust, love, and hate​[3]​  (Tiberius, 2008; Haybron, 2010; Smith, 2014). 





The second feature is our finiteness. Put abstractly, we are limited by beginnings and ends. Less abstractly, we are bound by: our biology or embodiment; our limited capabilities constrained by physical and social environments; our inability to have full control over our circumstances; and by incomplete and/or over-complex information when we make reflective decisions. These constraints make us vulnerable to harm, disappointment, failure, conflicting choices, and error when calculating what is best to pursue for our wellbeing and mental health (Sobel, 1994; Brink, 2003; Haybron, 2008, pp 177-98; Tiberius, 2008, pp 23-64). 

However, being limited in these respects also gives shape and form to our experiences, as our finiteness means that we cannot avoid being committed to certain objects of attachment which we care for, but not to others, and only at any one time, but which, paradoxically, allows us to choose these attachments meaningfully and with purpose (Heidegger, 1962; Tiberius, 2008, pp 65-88). In so doing, this commitment enables us to enjoy our lives by becoming immersed in the moment (Sumner, 1999, pp26-44; Tiberius, 2008, pp 74-5), and to become attuned to our lives (Haybron, 2008, pp 116-20). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that this individual immersion and attuning is worked-out within wider social contexts. 







The third feature is our sociability. We, for example, learn language and communicate with others, and we are members of social groups. These groups produce social rules of behaviour that also delineate private and public arenas of wellbeing and mental health. Chapters 3 and 4 explore how maintaining social identities and social capital are important social factors that enhance wellbeing and mental health. In addition, different ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are created and reproduced through acts of social cooperation (Sen, 1985; Rawls, 1973, pp 548-54), and often follow dominant social norms which, again, are defined and embedded within various institutional practices (Clarke and Cochrane, 1998). 





The fourth feature is the human capacity for cognition. This capability is mind-orientated, and involves exercising logic, gathering information and evidence, and engaging in creative and self-reflexive imagination. Through imagination and self-reflection we can, for example, picture new possibilities for our futures, and remember our pasts (Bradden-Mitchell and West, 2001; Kopf, 2002).  We can also understand our experiences, rationally calculate, and be reasonable towards others (Rawls, 1973, pp 108-117: Scanlon, 1998, pp 1-77). 

Cultivating these abilities is often regarded as crucial to how wellbeing and mental health are best promoted, most notably over life-times,. For example, cognition facilitates our having a wider perspective on our lives, in which we can critically reflect on our own subjective viewpoint from a more objective perspective (Nagel, 1991, pp 10-20; Tiberius, 2008, pp 78-83). That is, we can assess and view the subjective position we interpret and experience from a certain distance, and recognise the existence and perspectives of others as important (including our future selves) while acknowledging the legitimate claims often made against us as a result (Griffin, 1988, pp 127-312; Tiberius, 2008, pp 89-108: pp 161-81). 





The fifth feature is that we engage in complex processes of evaluation​[7]​. For example, it matters to our wellbeing and mental health, not only that we successfully accomplish goals and ambitions, but also that these goals and ambitions are defined as worthwhile (and see Raz, 1988, pp 288-320). Therefore, we do not just count our successes, we also evaluate them. Thus, what is valued is not created ex-nihilo, but the value attached to goals is formed within social arenas that determine how these evaluations occur, and the kinds of judgements that are made as a result. 

Value, can be understood as what is worthwhile to pursue including pastimes, career options, lifestyle choices, and so on. These values are pursued individually and/or in social groups as is explored in Chapters 3 and 4. Moreover, value can refer to moral or ethical principles, what is considered right, wrong, just or unjust (Griffin, 1988, pp 127-312; Tiberius, 2008, pp 161-81) and Chapters 12 and 24 return to these matters of value and ethics. Consequently, if we successfully pursue what we socially define as valuable, and that enhances our wellbeing and mental health, as much of the empirical evidence confirms (Ryff, 1989; Ryff and Keyes, 1995; Seligman, 2002; Diener and Diener, 2008), then identifying those social causation factors that assist in this process is also an essential part of developing effective mental healthcare. 

In addition, what we value is also derived from exercising self-knowledge and this enables us to be true to ourselves, or authentic, as it is sometimes called (Sumner, 1999, pp 156-70; Tiberius, 2008, pp 109-11). Therefore, when we commit to valuable goals, however they are socially constructed or defined, they should reflect our genuine desires, personal characteristics, ideals, and so on. Otherwise, these goals become disconnected from our lives (Sumner, 1999, pp 26-44; Parfit, 1987). 

Regarding wellbeing and mental health, if we evaluate our lives within the social world we inhabit as a reflection of what is genuine or authentic about us, then we can say that we ‘own’ or ‘identify’ with these shared evaluations which gives coherence to the way we judge our lives as successful or not. Subsequently, many people argue that facilitating wellbeing and mental health involves comprehending what is ‘true’ about the social world we inhabit, and then making accurate judgments about what individual people and groups seek to accomplish as genuinely valuable. Often, the resulting claim made is that deception, therefore, undermines personal wellbeing and mental health, even if believing the deceit makes us happier (Griffin, 1988; Sumner, 1999; Tiberius, 2008; Raz, 1988, pp 288-320; Rawls, 1973, pp 548-544). 





Finally, the sixth feature is our human capacity for free-will or agency. As individual people and/or as members of social groups, we set ourselves goals and have plans and ambitions considered valuable or worthwhile to pursue. For many people​[8]​, this capacity is underpinned by individual agency. This means that, to lesser or greater degrees, we choose from alternatives, and so become authors of our own actions and life-plans (Nozick, 1974; Kagan, 1986; Shoemaker, 1996). These alternatives are restricted by our biological and/or social environments, but, despite these restrictions, the broad claim here is that we all have options, however limited they might be. Moreover, these choices reflect our desires, which are shaped by information concerning these desires, and so become ‘informed’ (Griffin, 1988, pp 7-39). And, if we are genuinely successful in pursuing these informed desires, then our lives are said to be going well, and our wellbeing and mental health is enhanced. 

In various liberal philosophies of wellbeing, this view of agency has, unsurprisingly, been prominent, with arguments often focussing on how accomplishing individual goals is properly understood and measured, reflecting our evaluations, life-plans, and creative endeavours (Raz, 1988; Mill, 1991; and my arguments in Smith, 2012). 

These liberal philosophies also raise questions concerning the value of wellbeing, whether it should be valued substantively, even as the dominant end of all values, or as an inclusive or transparent value, with the latter leaving room for other values sitting independently of promoting wellbeing, such as freedom, justice, and aesthetic creation (Rawls, 1973, pp 548-544; Sen, 1985; Scanlon, 1998, pp 108-43). However, despite the important contribution made by these liberal theories to the philosophy and practice of wellbeing, our ability to fulfil our informed desires is also profoundly influenced by social causation factors that either restrict or augment our capacities to pursue these goals and ambitions. In addition, what is viewed or socially constructed as valuable coheres with wider social understandings of what are ‘best’ or ‘important’, which then affects which goals and ambitions we choose. 

CONCLUSION: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR COPRODUCTION IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Six Features of the Human Condition as Dynamic and Interrelated Characteristics

Whatever specific conception of wellbeing and mental health is defended, my claim in this chapter is that the six features of the human condition, are both dynamic and interrelated, and that these characteristics have an important bearing on how mental health is subsequently viewed and promoted. For example, and as evidenced throughout this book, the social determinants of wellbeing and mental health within and across social groupings, relate in complex ways to the embodied or medicalised or biological constitution of individual people. This complexity derives, in part, from how embodiment and sociability, as features of the human condition, are dynamically related and often changing, leading to large variances in both people’s experiences and the social and medical causes of their mental health. The implication for mental healthcare is that we should not assume that one type of intervention strategy will suit all people, because the complex and dynamic character of the relationship between these features is bound to produce an array of idiosyncrasies between individual people as these features variously interrelate. 

When the social determinants of mental health are properly considered, we have seen that we must not only uncover the social processes of social causation concerning the epidemiology of mental illness and mental health, but also those processes of social construction that affect how notions of illness, health and wellbeing are defined or given meaning within social contexts. The latter processes include, for example, how some minority groups are defined as ‘other’ and ‘different’ by more dominant groups, including those minority groups defined as ‘mentally ill’ by dominant groups defined as ‘healthy’. These processes affect how these minority groups are both viewed and treated. Notions of functional personhood, for example, are given meaning within social contexts that often make rigid distinctions between ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ that affect how individual people and groups of people are defined and treated as either mentally ‘ill’ or ‘healthy’. 

My recommendation is that we should be attentive to how these social construction processes are embedded in mental health practice. That is, to equip practitioners with the ability to critically reflect on their practice, fully recognising that this practice is an expression of dominant institutional ‘norms’ sanctioned by socially constructed notions of medical expertise, and so on, which then legitimate the exercise of professional power. One of the main points is that these socially constructed notions of medical expertise, and the subsequent exercise of professional power, often disguise or underestimate the role that social causation can play in the epidemiology of mental health.

This chapter highlights the argument that most accounts of wellbeing and mental health should include reference to agency as a central feature of care, that is, the capacity to formulate and implement life-plans that are considered by the agent as valuable and worthwhile to pursue. Chapter 22 considers agency from the perspective of its potential loss in many disadvantageous or extreme circumstances that are surveyed in Part 3. 

Moreover, from many philosophical perspectives, other features of the human condition also come into play when agency is exercised. So, our physical and biological make-up count, when we, for example, explain motivation concerning the choices and plans we make for ourselves. In addition, sociability also counts in exercising agency as social groups not only socially construct or define the parameters in which choices are defined as valuable, but it also allows us to focus on social causation factors that facilitate the degree to which these choices can be exercised (and see Chapters 3 and 4). Our cognitive features have an important role to play if these choices are to be properly informed by rational reflection, self-reflection, and collecting information and evidence prior to decision-making (Griffin, 1988, pp 11-20; Sobel, 1994; Tiberius, 2008, pp 109-36). Similarly, our evaluations also affect our choices, as we also can judge that our choices and actions are worthwhile and valuable, again, recognising that these judgements are also influenced and shaped within social contexts. 

This chapter highlights how agency is exercised when the various human features dynamically interrelate, which then contributes to what is a complex multi-layered decision-making process for people who inhabit various social worlds. This complex process leads to each person devising and implementing authentically-held, personal life-plans that individuals and wider society understand, as valuable. It is a process that also includes acknowledging the importance of each person exercising their agency, albeit while recognising the presence of dominant norms and values that help to define what is seen as authentically owned, valuable personal life-plans. Nevertheless, the capacity for responsible decision-making is then given a relatively free rein under this conception. This capacity acts as an alternative to more determinist accounts of wellbeing and mental health, that is, whether these determining factors are in our embodied biological make-up, our social environments, or a mixture of both. 

We can see that the implications for mental healthcare are profound and far-reaching, as the exercise of agency, by definition, means that it is impossible to entirely predict outcomes for individual people and groups when intervention strategies are put in place. Nevertheless, what becomes centrally important when recognising a person’s agency is that institutional mechanisms are established on the assumption that patients, clients or service-users are not passively engaged with circumstances that are beyond their control; but are, instead, defined, or socially constructed, as active and participant coproducers in how their care is managed and implemented. Coproduction includes participating equally and reciprocally in how people’s  mental conditions are defined or given meaning in relation to their lives (Davies, Sampson, Beesley, Smith, and Baldwin, 2014; Raffay, Wood, and Todd, 2016; Spencer, Dineen, and Phillips, 2013). The principle of coproduction takes seriously service-users’ subjective experiences and perspectives and how they define or give meaning to their lives, with people who are diagnosed as mentally ill being viewed as equal participants and experts on their conditions who are able to work alongside practitioners in developing their care.
 
The arguments presented in this chapter provide coproduction with a social philosophical justification derived from identifying six features of the human condition understood as universal. It is important to acknowledge both social causation and construction processes because they define and promote mental health within particular social contexts, and they impact variously upon these universal features.

Tensions in Coproduction and Social Policy Development

Finally, acknowledging that these complex and multi-layered understandings of wellbeing should be promoted in mental health and welfare practice, leads to tensions within social policy development which also need to be addressed. More specifically, aspects of the six features of the human condition described here can be in sharp conflict depending on how they are defined and subsequently relate. This has implications for how coproduction is viewed in policy and practice. 

There is, for example, considerable philosophical disagreement over how rational capacities concerning a person’s agency should be understood and facilitated. So, is someone acting rationally when she takes a bird’s-eye-view of her life and tries to make decisions without any perspectival bias toward time (past, present or future)? Or, is she being more rational when she has a perspectival bias toward her present, and near future, over the past and distant future (Smith, 2018; Parfit, 1987, pp 152-86; Persson, 1988; Shoemaker, 1996; Braddon-Mitchell and West, 2001; Brink, 2003; Yeager, 2008)? The point here is that, whatever way this question is answered, capacities for cognition, including critical self-reflection and exercising self-knowledge, may be construed as problems within these philosophical accounts because matters concerning the nature of time, our place and attitudes toward it, are highly contested. 

As a result, other difficult questions concerning how we understand and promote coproduction in healthcare are also thrown into sharp relief. To what degree should mental health practitioners accommodate for the present cognitive perspectives of the persons in their care, based on a certain bias toward this perspective given that the positions they hold are held by service-users now when they are constructed as ill? Or, to what degree should practitioners assume a bird’s-eye-view of this present perspective – this view being derived from their socially constructed medical expertise, and so on? 

With regard to issues of agency too, wellbeing and mental health may be enhanced if we accept, and become attuned to the limits of our condition presently, which may include accepting the social and other limitations of persons who have mental ill-health. We should recognise, too, that a presently-orientated ‘self-acceptance’ being conducive to presently occurring subjective wellbeing may conflict with the desire for change and enhanced objective capacities for the future, that, if implemented, would also enhance a person’s future wellbeing and mental health, however they are conceptualised (Clifton, Repper, Banks, and Remnant, 2013). 
















^1	  Berger and Luckmann were the first to use the term social construction. However, their central treatise concerning the sociology of knowledge and how public or shared meaning is socially created is also traceable to the other primary sources referenced here, and more besides.
^2	  The relationship between exercising power and public discourse is a moot point and is not explored in detail here (for example, see Lukes 2005; Mackenzie 2004; Rabinow 1984). Suffice it to say, that, in whatever way this relationship is understood, the claim here is that exercising power and the social production of discourse and shared meaning has a profound effect on those people who are defined as mentally ill and the professionals engaged in working with this group.
^3	  This is not implying that our emotions are entirely caused by these biological and/or physical characteristics, merely that some or part of our emotional responses can be caused by these characteristics, reflecting our embodiment. Precisely how our physical bodies and experiences are interpreted and viewed by us as members of social groups is highly debated, especially within the social constructionist literature (see Rabinow, 1984; Lechte, 1994; Joseph, 2003; MacKenzie, 2004; Lloyd, 2004; and endnote iv below).
^4	  This raises questions about the meaning of transcendence here. So, underpinning the arguments in this chapter is the assumption that none of the six features of the human condition outlined here can occur independently of social context. Nevertheless, insofar as these features of the human condition are universal (and so are shared across time and between cultures), they transcend social contexts. Once this, admittedly controversial, move is made, it is possible to accommodate the social constructionist account of mental health, but without reducing explanations about what human beings experience solely to use of language (and see endnote iii above). This move can also be found in my arguments concerning disability issues more widely, exploring how the medical and social models of disability can coherently relate and be interpreted (see Smith, 2009, pp 15-29; Smith, 2011, pp 107​-132).    
^5	  As will be explored below, the possibility for reciprocity is also central to the practice of coproduction in which patients, clients or service-users are defined as active participants or co-producers in: (i) how their care is conceptualised, managed and implemented; and (ii) how their mental health/illness is given meaning in relation to their lives.
^6	  For a discussion concerning our future selves and promoting wellbeing over a whole life, see my arguments in Smith, 2018. I identify how interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing are notoriously problematic as the levels and quality of wellbeing is hard to meaningfully measure between persons. However, I also explore how these problems are apparent with intrapersonal comparisons of wellbeing if plural identities occur over time for one person, which I claim they often do. I argue that these latter problems have important implications for social policy debates about enhancing wellbeing across time and between generations.
^7	  Strictly speaking, evaluation is a form of cognition, insofar as evaluation is a mental process culminating in a value judgement in the ways described previously. I am grateful to one of the editors of this book for pointing this out. However, the contention here is that evaluation has such a significant effect on wellbeing – and in how a person evaluates her own life – that it should be treated separately to this person’s more general capacity for cognition.
^8	  For example, biological and/or social determinists argue that human beings exercise little or no agency or free-will as human lives are shaped or determined by their natural and/or nurtured environments (for a recent defense of this determinist view see Miles, 2015). The question of agency is also debated extensively within the social constructionist literature explored here, with various positions being taken as to whether, or the extent to which human beings can exercise agency, given the influence of public discourse and language in shaping how we view and experience our lives (for example, see Rabinow, 1984; Mackenzie, 2004).REFERENCES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